Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
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Publication:1616084
DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1060-1zbMath1416.91031OpenAlexW3125553552MaRDI QIDQ1616084
Sebastian Kranz, Susanne Goldlücke
Publication date: 31 October 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000423.pdf
dynamic gamescomputationimperfect public monitoringmonetary transfersperfect public equilibriarelational contracting
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