An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring

DOI10.3982/TE1302MaRDI QIDQ4586097zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dilip Abreu, Yuliy Sannikov

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1302

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescomputationperfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited in

(10)

• Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
• Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Critical discount factor values in discounted supergames
• On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
• Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
• Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
• Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames
• Algorithms for stochastic games with perfect monitoring
• Empirical framework for two-player repeated games with random states

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