Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games

DOI10.3390/g8040047zbMath1410.91060OpenAlexW2766452142MaRDI QIDQ1656984

Kimmo Berg, Gijs Schoenmakers

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040047

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectionrepeated gamemixed strategypayoff set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Critical discount factor values in discounted supergames, Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games, Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames, Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames

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