Strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and discounting
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Publication:1319961
DOI10.1006/game.1994.1012zbMath0805.90129OpenAlexW2061509479MaRDI QIDQ1319961
David G. Luenberger, Mark B. Cronshaw
Publication date: 21 April 1994
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1012
deterrencediscountinginfinitely repeated gamesperfect monitoringstrongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs
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Critical discount factor values in discounted supergames ⋮ On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic games ⋮ Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games ⋮ Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games ⋮ Symmetry in \(n\)-player games ⋮ Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers ⋮ Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames ⋮ Computing equilibria in discounted dynamic games ⋮ Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames ⋮ FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES ⋮ Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches ⋮ The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
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