Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
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Publication:1741494
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2019.01.026zbMath1411.91071OpenAlexW2149365931WikidataQ128373116 ScholiaQ128373116MaRDI QIDQ1741494
Publication date: 3 May 2019
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.mitrikitti.fi/dp96.pdf
Games involving graphs (91A43) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items
Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games ⋮ Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games ⋮ A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff ⋮ On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games ⋮ Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames
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