FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES
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Publication:5174425
DOI10.1142/S0218348X14500169zbMath1306.28004MaRDI QIDQ5174425
Publication date: 17 February 2015
Published in: Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (6)
Critical discount factor values in discounted supergames ⋮ Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games ⋮ Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games ⋮ Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames ⋮ Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
Cites Work
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- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
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- A fractal dimension estimate for a graph-directed IFS of non-similarities
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Graph-directed iterated function systems with overlaps
- Sub-Self-Similar Sets
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