The myth of the folk theorem

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.016zbMATH Open1207.91012DBLPjournals/geb/BorgsCIKMP10OpenAlexW2051280392WikidataQ101126436 ScholiaQ101126436MaRDI QIDQ993783FDOQ993783

Authors: Christian Borgs, Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Jennifer T. Chayes, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Christos Papadimitriou 

Publication date: 20 September 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.016

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescomputable general equilibrium models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
• Learning, regret minimization, and equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (10)

• Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets
• Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems
• The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem
• Complexity of rational and irrational Nash equilibria
• Busting a Myth about Leśniewski and Definitions
• A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff
• Semidefinite programming for min-max problems and games
• The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games
• Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*

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