The myth of the folk theorem

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.016MaRDI QIDQ993783zbMATHOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Christian Borgs, Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Jennifer T. Chayes, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Christos Papadimitriou

Publication date 20 September 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.016

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescomputable general equilibrium models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economics of information (91B44)

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• Nash Equilibria: Where We Stand
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4202070 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• Learning, regret minimization, and equilibria
• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
• On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The approximation complexity of win-lose games
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium

Cited in

(10)

• Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
• Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems
• A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff
• Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
• Complexity of rational and irrational Nash equilibria
• Semidefinite programming for min-max problems and games
• The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games
• Not just an empty threat: subgame-perfect equilibrium in repeated games played by computationally bounded players
• Busting a Myth about Leśniewski and Definitions

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