How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?*

DOI10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1773zbMath1179.91032OpenAlexW2011159796MaRDI QIDQ3650534

Wojciech Olszewski, Johannes Hörner

Publication date: 14 December 2009

Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1773

zbMATH Keywords

robustnesscooperationfolk theoremprivate/public monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (14)

Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ Discontinuous stochastic games ⋮ Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information ⋮ Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring ⋮ The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Restricted feedback in long term relationships ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network ⋮ Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal ⋮ Natural strategic ability ⋮ Communication and cooperation in repeated games ⋮ Recall and private monitoring

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