Recall and private monitoring
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2343392
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010zbMath1318.91030MaRDI QIDQ2343392
Andrzej Skrzypacz, Christopher Phelan
Publication date: 5 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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Cites Work
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?*
- Beliefs and Private Monitoring
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games