Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
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Publication:5489074
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00583.xzbMath1145.91314OpenAlexW2114517897MaRDI QIDQ5489074
Johannes Hörner, Wojciech Olszewski, Jeffrey C. Ely
Publication date: 25 September 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4666156000000000367.pdf
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