Testing threats in repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.04.003MaRDI QIDQ1779815zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ran Spiegler

Publication date 1 June 2005

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4391749000000000445.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated gamesreciprocitysolution conceptsjustifiabilitytrigger strategiesNash Equilibrium with Tests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring

Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• Cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with perturbations
• Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Cited in

(3)

• An axiomatization of plays in repeated games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405868 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium

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