Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
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Publication:2344951
Summary: We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs [\textit{P. Battigalli} and \textit{M. Siniscalchi}, J. Econ. Theory 88, No. 1, 188--230 (1999; Zbl 0972.91020)] and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.
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Cites work
Cited in
(11)- Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Strongly consistent game forms
- Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
- Exploitable actions of believers in the ``law of small numbers in repeated constant-sum games
- Belief consistency and trade consistency
- Bayesian and consistent assessments
- Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality
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- Conditional belief types
- A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles
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