Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequential Equilibria
- The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium
- The space of conditional systems is a ball
Cited in
(11)- Bayesian and consistent assessments
- A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1149746 (Why is no real title available?)
- Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games
- The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
- An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments
- AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties
- Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
- AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium
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