An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.03.003MaRDI QIDQ492859zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter A. Streufert

Publication date 21 August 2015

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyadditive representationi-likelihoodinfinite relative likelihood

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3981120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3366923 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3395595 (Why is no real title available?)
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• An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments
• Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games
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• Function Theory on Some Nonarchimedean Fields
• Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
• Intuitive Probability on Finite Sets
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
• Measurement structures and linear inequalities
• Multistage Games with Communication
• On a new axiomatic theory of probability
• Sequential Equilibria
• Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality
• The asymptotic value in finite stochastic games

Cited in

(3)

• The category of node-and-choice preforms for extensive-form games
• An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments
• Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices

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