Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
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Publication:1368873
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2295zbMath0892.90199OpenAlexW1983435294MaRDI QIDQ1368873
Publication date: 1 October 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2295
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