Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium

DOI10.3390/G7040035MaRDI QIDQ725060zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040035

zbMATH Keywords

independenceBayesian updatingplausibility ordersequential equilibriumminimal belief revision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4089320 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• A course in game theory.
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• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium
• Belief change in branching time: AGM-consistency and iterated revision
• Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games
• Finite linear qualitative probability
• Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
• Iterated belief revision
• Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs
• Microeconomic theory
• On the logic of iterated belief revision
• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
• On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
• The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality

Cited in

(6)

• Epistemic game theory and logic: introduction
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium
• On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium

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