Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium

DOI10.3390/g7040035zbMath1407.91041OpenAlexW2487851743MaRDI QIDQ725060

Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date: 1 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040035

zbMATH Keywords

independenceBayesian updatingplausibility ordersequential equilibriumminimal belief revision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (1)

Epistemic game theory and logic: introduction

Cites Work

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