Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria

DOI10.2307/2951586zbMath0772.90089OpenAlexW2049855223MaRDI QIDQ4008533

Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951586

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionextensive form gamesimperfect informationsequential rationalitynormal form perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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