Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:4008533)
Recommendations
Cited in
(53)- Dynamic psychological games
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
- Rationality and bounded rationality
- Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem
- A game theory approach to fair and efficient resource allocation in cloud computing
- King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- Proper rationalizability and backward induction
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Updating confidence in beliefs
- Strong forward induction
- Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness
- Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
- ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
- Sequential equilibria in signaling games
- Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures
- An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness
- Backward induction in games without perfect recall
- Strategic reasoning: building cognitive models from logical formulas
- On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
- Myopic perception in repeated games
- Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
- Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?
- Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
- On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria
- Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium in extensive games
- What drives people's choices in turn-taking games, if not game-theoretic rationality?
- Forward induction equilibrium
- From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
- Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
- Sequential equilibria in signaling games
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
- The concept of subgame perfection -- some discontents
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Structural rationality in dynamic games
- Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
- Level-k thinking in the extensive form
- On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
- The logic of backward induction
- Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
This page was built for publication: Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4008533)
