On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
From MaRDI portal
Publication:705862
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003zbMath1085.91003MaRDI QIDQ705862
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003
Conditional dominance; Forward induction; Normal form information set; Rationalizability; Sequential best response; Weak dominance
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On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games, The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
Cites Work
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