Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4368668
DOI10.2307/2971739zbMath0890.90184MaRDI QIDQ4368668
Publication date: 16 July 1998
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2971739
91A10: Noncooperative games
Related Items
RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games, A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games, Corrigendum to ``Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior, Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games, On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations, Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison, On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response, The equivalence of Bayes and causal rationality in games, Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games, The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology, Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction, Self-admissible sets, Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games, Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games, Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information, Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction, Admissibility and common belief., Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction, Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation, King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot, A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games, Strong belief and forward induction reasoning., On the epistemic foundation for backward induction, Dynamic interactive epistemology, Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality, Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium, Cycles of learning in the centipede game, Comprehensive rationalizability, The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games, Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies, Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning, Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs, Uncertain information structures and backward induction, An epistemic approach to stochastic games, Conservative belief and rationality, Preference-based belief operators, Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness, Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
