Admissibility and common belief.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1395583
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00551-1zbMath1052.91007MaRDI QIDQ1395583
Publication date: 1 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A10: Noncooperative games
Related Items
Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms, Strong belief and forward induction reasoning., On the epistemic foundation for backward induction, Preference-based belief operators, Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
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