Admissibility and common belief.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1395583
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00551-1zbMath1052.91007MaRDI QIDQ1395583
Publication date: 1 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
On the use (and abuse) of logic in game theory, Lexicographic beliefs and assumption, Price floors and competition, Weak belief and permissibility, Cautious belief and iterated admissibility, Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox, Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games, The reasoning-based expected utility procedure, On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes, A minimal logic for interactive epistemology, Comprehensive rationalizability, Preference-based belief operators, Self-admissible sets, Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies, Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies, Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games, A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality, Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms, Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games, Strong belief and forward induction reasoning., On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
- An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- On solutions of Bayesian games
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
- Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
- Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
- Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- "Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities
- A Definition of Subjective Probability
- Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
