Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1815192
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0073zbMATH Open0859.90130OpenAlexW1965008420MaRDI QIDQ1815192FDOQ1815192
Publication date: 7 November 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0073
extensive form gamesnon-equilibrium modeldynamic learningNash equilibrium refinements\(\tau\)-theoryrational strategic behavior
Cited In (20)
- Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
- Iterated elimination procedures
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Some anomalies of farsighted strategic behavior
- Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- A misfit model: irrational deterrence and bounded rationality
- Admissibility and common belief.
- King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Theories of coalitional rationality
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
- Epistemic conditions for rationalizability
- Corrigendum to ``Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
- Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games
- Economists' models of learning
- On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
Recommendations
This page was built for publication: Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1815192)
