Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0763zbMath1028.91004OpenAlexW2092717433MaRDI QIDQ1593744

Christian Ewerhart

Publication date: 25 January 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0763

zbMATH Keywords

dominated strategiesfinite games of perfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items

Lloyd Shapley and chess with imperfect information ⋮ The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game ⋮ Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance ⋮ Backward induction and the game-theoretic analysis of chess. ⋮ Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.

Cites Work

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• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
• A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
• Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment
• Pure Strategy Dominance

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