Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0763zbMATH Open1028.91004OpenAlexW2092717433MaRDI QIDQ1593744FDOQ1593744

Authors: Christian Ewerhart 

Publication date: 25 January 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0763

Recommendations

• Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
• Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
• On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
• The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies

zbMATH Keywords

dominated strategiesfinite games of perfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• A course in game theory.
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pure Strategy Dominance
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
• ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
• A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
• Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment

Cited In (5)

• Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
• The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
• Backward induction and the game-theoretic analysis of chess.
• Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
• Lloyd Shapley and chess with imperfect information

This page was built for publication: Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1593744)