Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
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Publication:1593744
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0763zbMath1028.91004OpenAlexW2092717433MaRDI QIDQ1593744
Publication date: 25 January 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0763
Related Items
Lloyd Shapley and chess with imperfect information ⋮ The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game ⋮ Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance ⋮ Backward induction and the game-theoretic analysis of chess. ⋮ Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
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