Pure Strategy Dominance
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5286050
DOI10.2307/2951557zbMath0768.90103OpenAlexW2035621567MaRDI QIDQ5286050
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951557
Decision theory (91B06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Decision theory for games (91A35) Mathematical psychology (91E99)
Related Items
A NOTE ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF RATIONALIZABILITY CONCEPTS IN GENERALIZED NICE GAMES ⋮ Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes ⋮ Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium ⋮ Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets ⋮ Rationalizability and logical inference ⋮ Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games ⋮ On rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces ⋮ Common knowledge and limit knowledge ⋮ The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization ⋮ Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents ⋮ Iterated strict dominance in general games ⋮ AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE ⋮ A minimal logic for interactive epistemology ⋮ A three-person deterministic graphical game without Nash equilibria ⋮ Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis ⋮ On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules ⋮ Rationalizable strategies in random games ⋮ Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance ⋮ Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory
