Pure Strategy Dominance

DOI10.2307/2951557zbMATH Open0768.90103OpenAlexW2035621567MaRDI QIDQ5286050FDOQ5286050

Authors: Tilman Börgers 

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951557

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zbMATH Keywords

undominated strategiesexpected utility maximizing strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Mathematical psychology (91E99) Noncooperative games (91A10) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Cited In (28)

• Rationalizability and logical inference
• A NOTE ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF RATIONALIZABILITY CONCEPTS IN GENERALIZED NICE GAMES
• Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
• Iterated elimination procedures
• Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
• Order independence for rationalizability
• On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
• Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games
• Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Elimination of dominated strategies and inessential players
• Rationalizability in general situations
• Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis
• An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
• Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
• AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
• A three-person deterministic graphical game without Nash equilibria
• Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
• Rationalizable strategies in random games
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
• Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces
• Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents
• Common knowledge and limit knowledge
• A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
• The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces
• Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory
• Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
• A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes

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