Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:855370)
Recommendations
- A NOTE ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF RATIONALIZABILITY CONCEPTS IN GENERALIZED NICE GAMES
- Nash equilibrium uniqueness in nice games with isotone best replies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 177089
- A new existence and uniqueness theorem for continuous games
- Strong rationalizability for two-player noncooperative games
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3466042 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games
- Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
- Choquet rationality
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- On Type 2 Semi-Algebras of Continuous Functions
- Pure Strategy Dominance
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q855370)