Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets
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Publication:855370
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2006.01.001zbMATH Open1142.91015OpenAlexW2071933652MaRDI QIDQ855370FDOQ855370
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.01.001
Nash equilibriumCournot competitionfixed point theoremsiterative solution conceptspoint-rationalizability
Cites Work
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- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Pure Strategy Dominance
- Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
- Choquet rationality
- A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games
- On Type 2 Semi-Algebras of Continuous Functions
Cited In (2)
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