A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
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Publication:516245
DOI10.1007/s11229-015-0960-5zbMath1396.03019MaRDI QIDQ516245
Publication date: 14 March 2017
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0960-5
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