Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
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Publication:1036069
DOI10.1007/s11229-009-9559-zzbMath1183.03011OpenAlexW2060336054MaRDI QIDQ1036069
Sonja Smets, Alexandru Baltag, Jonathan Alexander Zvesper
Publication date: 4 November 2009
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9559-z
Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
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