On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00314-2zbMATH Open1434.91017OpenAlexW2944593191MaRDI QIDQ2175359FDOQ2175359

Authors Iryna Topolyan

Publication date 29 April 2020

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00314-2

zbMATH Keywords

partial orderdynamic gamesepistemic game theoryinformation setcommon belief in future rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Contributions to the theory of games. Vol. II
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Recall in extensive form games
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality

Cited in

(5)

• Finite reasoning procedures for dynamic games
• An epistemic approach to stochastic games
• Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
• Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality

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