On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets

DOI10.1007/s13235-019-00314-2zbMath1434.91017OpenAlexW2944593191MaRDI QIDQ2175359

Iryna Topolyan

Publication date: 29 April 2020

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00314-2

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamespartial orderepistemic game theoryinformation setcommon belief in future rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior

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