On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00314-2zbMATH Open1434.91017OpenAlexW2944593191MaRDI QIDQ2175359FDOQ2175359

Iryna Topolyan

Publication date: 29 April 2020

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00314-2

zbMATH Keywords

partial orderdynamic gamesepistemic game theoryinformation setcommon belief in future rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
• The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Recall in extensive form games
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
• On the epistemic foundation for backward induction

Cited In (1)

• Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness

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