Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
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Publication:2636780
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.01.008zbMATH Open1281.91036OpenAlexW2087917059MaRDI QIDQ2636780FDOQ2636780
Publication date: 18 February 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.008
Cites Work
- On the centipede game
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- DEFINING KNOWLEDGE IN TERMS OF BELIEF: THE MODAL LOGIC PERSPECTIVE
- Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
Cited In (15)
- Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
- Optimal decision rules in repeated games where players infer an opponent's mind via simplified belief calculation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
- On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators
- Rational beliefs in extensive games
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
- Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
- On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
- Doxastic conditions for backward induction
- Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
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