Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.01.008MaRDI QIDQ2636780zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dov Samet

Publication date 18 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

rationalityperfect informationbackward inductioncommon beliefcentipede game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Substantive rationality and backward induction
• From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
• Substantive rationality and backward induction
• On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
• Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5734945 (Why is no real title available?)
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• DEFINING KNOWLEDGE IN TERMS OF BELIEF: THE MODAL LOGIC PERSPECTIVE
• Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
• On the centipede game

Cited in

(23)

• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
• Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
• Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
• Substantive rationality and backward induction
• Uncertain information structures and backward induction
• On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
• Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information
• Doxastic conditions for backward induction
• The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
• Common knowledge of rationality in extensive games
• The logic of backward induction
• Rational beliefs in extensive games
• Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4154411 (Why is no real title available?)
• Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
• Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
• Substantive rationality and backward induction
• Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
• Optimal decision rules in repeated games where players infer an opponent's mind via simplified belief calculation
• On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators
• A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795156 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information

This page was built for publication: Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2636780)