Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.008zbMath1281.91036OpenAlexW2087917059MaRDI QIDQ2636780

Dov Samet

Publication date: 18 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitybackward inductionperfect informationcommon beliefcentipede game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (5)

Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance ⋮ A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• On the centipede game
• Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
• Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• DEFINING KNOWLEDGE IN TERMS OF BELIEF: THE MODAL LOGIC PERSPECTIVE

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