Rational beliefs in extensive games

DOI10.1007/BF00134094zbMATH Open0763.90101MaRDI QIDQ1200531FDOQ1200531

Authors: Giacomo Bonanno 

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

subgame-perfect equilibriumextensive gamebelief system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• Sequential Equilibria

Cited In (14)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
• On expressing maximum information in extensive games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements
• Rational beliefs in rationalizability
• Farsighted rationality in hedonic games
• Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
• Players' information in extensive games
• Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
• Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
• Rational belief structures and rational belief equilibria
• Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

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