Rational beliefs in extensive games

DOI10.1007/BF00134094MaRDI QIDQ1200531zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

subgame-perfect equilibriumextensive gamebelief system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements
• Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
• Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence
• Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games

Cites work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.

Cited in

(14)

• Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
• Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements
• On expressing maximum information in extensive games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1908242 (Why is no real title available?)
• Players' information in extensive games
• Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
• Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6870585 (Why is no real title available?)
• Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
• Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
• Rational belief structures and rational belief equilibria
• Rational beliefs in rationalizability
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1168312 (Why is no real title available?)
• Farsighted rationality in hedonic games

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