Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.03.001zbMath1331.91045OpenAlexW2030034141MaRDI QIDQ491310

Patricia Rich

Publication date: 24 August 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.03.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• Some Experimental Games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games

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