Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
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Cites work
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Belief in the opponents' future rationality
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Dynamic epistemic logic
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Some experimental games
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
- Two modellings for theory change
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