Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
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Publication:1296383
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00007-9zbMATH Open0963.91016OpenAlexW2040597815WikidataQ127725285 ScholiaQ127725285MaRDI QIDQ1296383FDOQ1296383
Publication date: 27 June 2001
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00007-9
Cites Work
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- Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
Cited In (45)
- An epistemic logic of extensive games
- Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
- Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
- CONDITIONAL BELIEFS: FROM NEIGHBOURHOOD SEMANTICS TO SEQUENT CALCULUS
- On Tolerance Analysis of Games with Belief Revision
- Bradley conditionals and dynamic choice
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
- Choice-driven counterfactuals
- Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
- ``Backward coinduction, Nash equilibrium and the rationality of escalation
- Updating confidence in beliefs
- Community-based reasoning in games: salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals
- Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
- Dynamic interactive epistemology
- Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction
- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
- On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
- A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
- From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
- Existence and definability of states of the world
- Agent connectedness and backward induction
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Finitely additive beliefs and universal type spaces
- PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES
- The logic of backward induction
- Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
- Understanding the Brandenburger-Keisler paradox
- Preference-based belief operators
- Rational play in extensive-form games
- Common priors under endogenous uncertainty
- Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
- Mistakes about conventions and meanings
- Periodic strategies. II: Generalizations and extensions
- Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
- A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
- Practical reasoning, rule-following and belief revision: an account in terms of Jeffrey's rule
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
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