Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52447 (Why is no real title available?)
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
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- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
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- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Two modellings for theory change
Cited in
(53)- Mistakes about conventions and meanings
- Agent connectedness and backward induction
- Preference-based belief operators
- Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
- Bradley conditionals and dynamic choice
- Dynamic interactive epistemology
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Choice-driven counterfactuals
- Rational play in extensive-form games
- Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
- Understanding the Brandenburger-Keisler paradox
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
- An epistemic logic of extensive games
- Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
- Knowledge, behavior, and rationality: rationalizability in epistemic games
- Updating confidence in beliefs
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
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- On Tolerance Analysis of Games with Belief Revision
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- Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
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- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
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- Common priors under endogenous uncertainty
- Finitely additive beliefs and universal type spaces
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- Conditional beliefs: from neighbourhood semantics to sequent calculus
- Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
- Existence and definability of states of the world
- Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games
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