Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
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Publication:1296383
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00007-9zbMath0963.91016OpenAlexW2040597815WikidataQ127725285 ScholiaQ127725285MaRDI QIDQ1296383
Publication date: 27 June 2001
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00007-9
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Cites Work
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