Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2022.102635zbMATH Open1490.91024OpenAlexW4206956931MaRDI QIDQ2138377FDOQ2138377
Authors: Stephan Jagau, Andres Perea 
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102635
Recommendations
epistemic game theorypsychological gamesrationalizabilitystrategic rationalitybelief-dependent motivationcommon belief in rationality
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Cited In (8)
- Beyond coincidence: the reasoning process underlying utility proportional beliefs process
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Utility proportional beliefs
- Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games
- Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
- On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
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