Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
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Publication:2138377
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Cites work
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Cited in
(8)- Beyond coincidence: the reasoning process underlying utility proportional beliefs process
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1168312 (Why is no real title available?)
- Utility proportional beliefs
- Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games
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- On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
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