Equilibrium refinement in psychological games
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Publication:1189699
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90016-LzbMATH Open0761.90106OpenAlexW2089476919MaRDI QIDQ1189699FDOQ1189699
Authors: V. W. Kolpin 
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90016-l
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4012365
Cites Work
Cited In (8)
- Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Dynamic psychological games
- Credibility of information in ``soft games with interperception of emotions.
- Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making
- Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
- Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity
- COMMENTS ON ZELENÝ'S PAPER CONCERNING COGNITIVE EQUILIBRIA
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