Equilibrium refinement in psychological games
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Publication:1189699
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4012365
Cites work
Cited in
(8)- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
- Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
- Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making
- Credibility of information in ``soft games with interperception of emotions.
- Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity
- COMMENTS ON ZELENÝ'S PAPER CONCERNING COGNITIVE EQUILIBRIA
- Dynamic psychological games
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