Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1054zbMATH Open0820.90130OpenAlexW3122124571MaRDI QIDQ1339739FDOQ1339739

Authors: Andreas Blume 

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1054

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• A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
• Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
• Sender-receiver games with cooperation
• Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
• Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
• Refinamientos del concepto de equilibrio en extensiones generalizadas de juegos finitos
• Equilibrium refinement in psychological games
• ON EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT FOR DISCONTINUOUS GAMES

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamesbabbling equilibriaeffectiveness of perturbation refinementspooling equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (9)

• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Equilibrium refinement in psychological games
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• Signaling games. Dynamics of evolution and learning
• Nash blocks
• Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games
• Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
• MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
• A note on pre-play communication

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