Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
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Publication:2496231
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.004zbMath1152.91374MaRDI QIDQ2496231
Publication date: 12 July 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.004
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Cites Work
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