Credible proposals in communication games

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2206zbMATH Open0883.90126OpenAlexW2019932427MaRDI QIDQ1363528FDOQ1363528

Iñigo Zapater

Publication date: 10 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2206

Recommendations

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Communication between rational agents

zbMATH Keywords

simple communication gamesnonequilibrium theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (8)

• Communication between rational agents
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Pragmatic reasoning about unawareness
• Informal communication
• Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
• Rationalizable signaling
• Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
• Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games

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