Communication between rational agents
The paper deals with the study of credible communication in simple communication games. As a matter of fact, the author introduces a new solution concept which does guarantee communication in some games. The solution concept in question is called Credible Message Rationalizability and combines the assumptions of rich language and rationality of agents. That is, the author assumes both full rationality without imposing equilibrium conditions and the natural behaviour of agents about the use of language: agents have a propensity to speak the truth and to believe others speak the truth, but use the game's strategic incentives to check whether such behavior and beliefs are rational. The author also introduces an equilibrium version of the concept developed and proves the existence of the so-called Credible Message Equilibrium for simple communicaton games. The theory developed is illustrated by several examples.
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Sequential Equilibria
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Theories of coalitional rationality
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk
- Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
- Validated equilibrium and sequential spatial competition games
- Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining
- Credible proposals in communication games
- A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
- Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
- Language and coordination games
- The strategic role of nonbinding communication
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
- Message exchange games in strategic contexts
- Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Language, games, and evolution: an introduction
- Strategic Agent Communication: An Argumentation-Driven Approach
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1305382 (Why is no real title available?)
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- Joint Perception in Agent Communication
- How to do things with words: a Bayesian approach
- Rational coordination with no communication or conventions
- Signaling games
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
- A note on pre-play communication
- Structural Information and Communication Complexity
- Rational Processes Related to Communicating Markov Processes
- Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
- Fragile meaning -- an experiment
- Artificial intelligence and language
- Epistemic modality and coordination under uncertainty
- Cheap talk with two-sided private information
- Meaning in communication games
- Informal communication
- Communication with endogenous information acquisition
- Rationalizable signaling
- Pragmatic reasoning about unawareness
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