Communication between rational agents
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Recommendations
Cites work
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Sequential Equilibria
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
Cited in
(37)- Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
- Signaling games
- Theories of coalitional rationality
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- Informal communication
- Structural Information and Communication Complexity
- A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
- Rational coordination with no communication or conventions
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Rationalizable signaling
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
- Artificial intelligence and language
- Validated equilibrium and sequential spatial competition games
- Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining
- Fragile meaning -- an experiment
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Strategic Agent Communication: An Argumentation-Driven Approach
- Rational Processes Related to Communicating Markov Processes
- Language and coordination games
- How to do things with words: a Bayesian approach
- Joint Perception in Agent Communication
- Communication with endogenous information acquisition
- Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1305382 (Why is no real title available?)
- Language, games, and evolution: an introduction
- Message exchange games in strategic contexts
- Epistemic modality and coordination under uncertainty
- Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
- Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
- A note on pre-play communication
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
- Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- The strategic role of nonbinding communication
- Cheap talk with two-sided private information
- Pragmatic reasoning about unawareness
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