Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
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Publication:5953417
DOI10.1006/game.2000.0830zbMath0989.91523OpenAlexW1991577073MaRDI QIDQ5953417
Geoffrey B. Sprinkle, Douglas V. De Jong, Andreas Blume, Yong-Gwan Kim
Publication date: 23 January 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0830
communicationgame theorylearningevolutioninformation transmissioncheap talkincentive alignmentmeaningrefinements
Related Items (29)
Truth and trust in communication: experiments on the effect of a competitive context ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication ⋮ Coordination via correlation: an experimental study ⋮ Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation ⋮ How signaling conventions are established ⋮ Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences ⋮ Mediated talk: an experiment ⋮ Fragile meaning -- an experiment ⋮ David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning ⋮ Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games ⋮ Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games. ⋮ Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response ⋮ Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games ⋮ The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets ⋮ Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes ⋮ Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation ⋮ Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study ⋮ Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games ⋮ Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness ⋮ Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information ⋮ Authority and communication in the laboratory ⋮ The evolution of ambiguity in sender -- receiver signaling games ⋮ Communication-enhancing vagueness ⋮ Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games ⋮ An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk ⋮ Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
Cites Work
- Communication between rational agents
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- An experimental study of strategic information transmission
- Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
- Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
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