Evolutions of communication with partial common interest

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0830zbMath0989.91523MaRDI QIDQ5953417

Andreas Blume, Yong-Gwan Kim, Geoffrey B. Sprinkle, Douglas V. De Jong

Publication date: 23 January 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0830

zbMATH Keywords

communication; game theory; learning; evolution; information transmission; cheap talk; incentive alignment; meaning; refinements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes, Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness, Authority and communication in the laboratory, Truth and trust in communication: experiments on the effect of a competitive context, Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information, Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games., Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation, Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study, Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication, Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games, Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria

Cites Work

• Communication between rational agents
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
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• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
• Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission