Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.012zbMATH Open1347.91069OpenAlexW3122260256MaRDI QIDQ263383FDOQ263383
Jonathan Woon, William Minozzi
Publication date: 5 April 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.012
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behavioral modelsbounded rationalitylaboratory experimentlevel-\(k\)multiple senderssender-receiver gamesstrategic information transmission
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
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- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
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- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- An experimental study of strategic information transmission
- Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
- Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- A Theory of Credibility
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Communication with multiple senders: An experiment
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
Cited In (6)
- The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games
- Lying for votes
- On the competition of two conflicting messages
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research
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