Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.012MaRDI QIDQ263383zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William Minozzi, Jonathan Woon

Publication date 5 April 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.012

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral modelsbounded rationalitylaboratory experimentlevel-\(k\)multiple senderssender-receiver gamesstrategic information transmission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A Theory of Credibility
• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
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• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Communication with multiple senders: an experiment
• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion

Cited in

(6)

• The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games
• Lying for votes
• On the competition of two conflicting messages
• An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research

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• Z-Tree

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