A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research
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Publication:649134
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0496-ZzbMATH Open1235.91155OpenAlexW2081165607MaRDI QIDQ649134FDOQ649134
Authors: Daniel F. Stone 
Publication date: 30 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0496-z
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Cites Work
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
Cited In (2)
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