A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0496-ZMaRDI QIDQ649134zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel F. Stone

Publication date 30 November 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0496-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

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• A signaling model of peaceful political change

Cites work

• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests

Cited in

(2)

• Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
• A signaling theory of congressional oversight

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