Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.11.004zbMATH Open1284.91095OpenAlexW3121547760MaRDI QIDQ2437173FDOQ2437173

Authors Marco Battaglini, Uliana Makarov

Publication date 3 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcheap talkmultiple audiences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Communication with multiple senders: an experiment
• Cursed Equilibrium
• How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
• The swing voter's curse in the laboratory

Cited in

(21)

• The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games
• Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
• Lying for votes
• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation
• Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: a cheap talk game with multiple audiences
• The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
• Delegation based on cheap talk
• Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
• Money talks? An experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money
• What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• Communication with evidence in the lab
• Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge
• Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
• Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
• Communication with multiple senders: an experiment
• Changing partners in a cheap talk game: experimental evidence

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• Z-Tree

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