Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
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Cites work
- A model of pre-game communication
- Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: an experimental approach
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
- Bare promises: an experiment
- Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis
- Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
- Communication with multiple senders: an experiment
- Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
- Gender-based focal points
- How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
- Promises and Partnership
- Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
- What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
- When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
- Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals
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