The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
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Cites work
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- Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
- Coordination and information in critical mass games: An experimental study
- Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
- Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4167875 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- Introduction to experimental game theory
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- Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- The Logic of Inductive Inference
- When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
Cited in
(49)- Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
- A model of pre-game communication
- A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
- When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
- Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium.
- Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
- Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
- Communication, leadership and coordination failure
- The anticipatory effect of nonverbal communication
- Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task
- Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination
- Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination
- What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
- Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games
- Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game
- ``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games
- Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation
- Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
- Intention or request: the impact of message structures
- Language and coordination games
- Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups
- Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma
- Speech is silver, silence is golden
- Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
- The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games
- Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
- When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
- Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives
- Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs
- Heterogeneity, inequity aversion, and group performance
- Coordination via delay: theory and experiment
- Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information
- Coordination in games with incomplete information: experimental results
- Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach
- Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
- Changing partners in a cheap talk game: experimental evidence
- How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games
- The team allocator game: allocation power in public goods games
- Network reciprocity turns cheap talk into a force for cooperation
- Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning
- Efficiency gains through social influence in a minimum effort game
- Learning coordination through new actions
- A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication
- Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
- Strategic commitment to forgo information: evidence from the lab
- Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
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