The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
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Publication:869864
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.001zbMath1142.91358OpenAlexW1973522638MaRDI QIDQ869864
Andreas Ortmann, Andreas Blume
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.001
Order statistics; empirical distribution functions (62G30) Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (31)
COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ⋮ Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game ⋮ Communication, leadership and coordination failure ⋮ The anticipatory effect of nonverbal communication ⋮ Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach ⋮ Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games ⋮ What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence ⋮ Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games ⋮ The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games ⋮ Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude ⋮ Coordination via delay: theory and experiment ⋮ Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task ⋮ The team allocator game: allocation power in public goods games ⋮ Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium. ⋮ Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game ⋮ Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups ⋮ When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory ⋮ Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives ⋮ Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs ⋮ Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination ⋮ Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination ⋮ ``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games ⋮ Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions ⋮ Intention or request: the impact of message structures ⋮ Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study ⋮ Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations ⋮ Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma ⋮ Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information ⋮ Speech is silver, silence is golden ⋮ Heterogeneity, inequity aversion, and group performance
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