COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
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Publication:3166249
DOI10.1142/S021919891100309XzbMath1259.91037MaRDI QIDQ3166249
Publication date: 10 October 2012
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100309x
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