Playing safe in coordination games: The roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00552-3zbMath1032.91681MaRDI QIDQ1395587

D. Massart

Publication date: 1 July 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Game theory; Experimental economics; Equilibrium selection; Payoff dominance; Risk dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A05: 2-person games

91A90: Experimental studies

91B68: Matching models

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Cites Work

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• When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
• A survey of exact inference for contingency tables. With comments and a rejoinder by the author
• An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
• Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study
• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games