Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study

DOI10.2307/2297903MaRDI QIDQ4306281zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas R. Palfrey, Howard Rosenthal

Publication date 24 October 1994

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80966/

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationdiscounted repeated playone-shot Bayesian Nash equilibriumpublic good environment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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• Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
• Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• Coordination through reputations: A laboratory experiment
• Repetition, communication, and coordination failure
• Building rational cooperation
• An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games
• At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
• Observability of partners' past play and cooperation: experimental evidence
• Playing safe in coordination games: The roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play
• Intelligence, errors, and cooperation in repeated interactions
• Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games

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