Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study

DOI10.2307/2297903zbMATH Open0809.90142OpenAlexW1970460225MaRDI QIDQ4306281FDOQ4306281

Authors: Thomas R. Palfrey, Howard Rosenthal 

Publication date: 24 October 1994

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80966/

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zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationdiscounted repeated playone-shot Bayesian Nash equilibriumpublic good environment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (21)

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• Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games
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• Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
• Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: an experiment
• Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games?
• Building rational cooperation
• Playing safe in coordination games: The roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play
• IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
• Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• Repeated interaction and its impact on cooperation and surplus allocation -- an experimental analysis
• Observability of partners' past play and cooperation: experimental evidence
• Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes
• An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games
• At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency

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