Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00381-5zbMath0981.91007OpenAlexW2142206572MaRDI QIDQ5940806

Kenneth D. Clark, Martin Sefton

Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00381-5

zbMATH Keywords

signalingcoordinationexperimental gamesrepetition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites Work

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