Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game

DOI10.1007/BF01263281zbMath0880.90150OpenAlexW4239021648MaRDI QIDQ1365007

Ulrich Kamecke

Publication date: 28 August 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01263281

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesexperimental designbest-reply-structure-preserving matching scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty ⋮ A randomized tabu search-based approach for perfect stranger matching in economic experiments ⋮ Playing a game or making a decision? Methodological issues in the measurement of distributional preferences ⋮ Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk ⋮ Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria ⋮ Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result

Cites Work

• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement

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