Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game

DOI10.1007/BF01263281MaRDI QIDQ1365007zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ulrich Kamecke

Publication date 28 August 1997

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01263281

zbMATH Keywords

experimental designrepeated gamesbest-reply-structure-preserving matching scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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• Best-reply matching in games.
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Cites work

• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement

Cited in

(6)

• Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• A randomized tabu search-based approach for perfect stranger matching in economic experiments
• Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty
• Playing a game or making a decision? Methodological issues in the measurement of distributional preferences
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk

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