Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2832zbMATH Open1015.91005OpenAlexW1968061316MaRDI QIDQ697946FDOQ697946

Authors: Elena Katok, M. Sefton, Abdullah Yavas 

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/06067e8eaa96f945131f1f57f5d847ceb301f76b

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zbMATH Keywords

dominated strategiesbackward inductionAbreu-Matsushima mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• The chain store paradox
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms: Experimental evidence
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria
• Virtual implementation in backwards induction
• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
• A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms

Cited In (10)

• Introduction to experimental game theory
• Double implementation without no-veto-power
• The path to equilibrium in sequential and simultaneous games: a mousetracking study
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
• Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
• King Solomon's dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies
• Do individuals use backward induction in dynamic optimization problems? An experimental investigation

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