Double implementation without no-veto-power
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Recommendations
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
Cites work
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Implementation with evidence
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- The bargaining problem
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
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